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CALCULATING ROYALTY: 
“COSTS” SUBSEQUENT TO
PRODUCTION
Professor Owen L. Anderson
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Royalty Valuation:
Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined 
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically?
Part 1
Why All the Fuss? What Does History Reveal? 
Owen L. Anderson
THE ISSUES:
(1) WHY SO MUCH RECENT ROYALTY 
LITIGATION?
(2) WHAT DOES "ROYALTY" MEAN?
(3) MUST LESSEE PAY ROYALTY ON VALUE 
ADDED BY “POST-PRODUCTION” ACTIVITIES 
UNDER COMMON GAS ROYALTY CLAUSES?
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My Conclusion
Absent an express royalty provision to the contrary, 
lessees should not have to pay royalty on value 
added by “post-production” activities.
Three general principles:
(1) royalty should be payable on “production;”
(2) production is not complete until a “first- 
marketable product” has been obtained;
(3) express royalty clause provisions govern over 
these first two principles, but because royalty 
clauses are both executory and anticipatory in 
nature, they should be construed as a whole, in 
light of current market realities (not narrowly 
construed by isolating certain words or phrases 
that ignore general intent).
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So why all the fuss?
First, there is great disagreement over what constitutes 
“production.”
Compare: Texas, Oklahoma & Louisiana
Texas Courts
“Production,” under the habendum clause. 
requires actual extraction and use or marketing.
Likewise, under “market value”/“market price” 
gas royalty clauses, royalty is payable on current 
market value when gas is actually extracted from the 
ground and used or marketed, even though lessee 
may have received a different contract price and “take 
or pay” payments.
Nevertheless, under NationsBank, royalty gas is 
apparently valued immediately upon extraction at the 
wellhead (not after its actual use or marketing). [In 
other words, royalty is payable on the “intrinsic value” 
of gas at the wellhead and commonly calculated by 
deducting post-wellhead costs.]
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Oklahoma Courts
Unlike Texas, “production,” under the habendum 
clause, occurs when a completed well is capable of 
producing oil or gas.
But, like Texas, “production,” under the royalty 
clause, requires actual production. Thus, like Texas, 
royalty is not payable on “take or pay” payments.
Nevertheless, unlike Texas, “market price” or 
“market value” royalties are generally payable on 
contract prices, not on current values when the gas is 
actually extracted.
Unlike Texas, royalty is valued upon marketing. 
not immediately upon extraction. [In other words, 
certain post-wellhead costs are not deductible.]
Louisiana
Like Texas and unlike Oklahoma, “production” 
under the habendum clause requires actual extraction 
and use or marketing of gas, but is valued immediately 
upon extraction.
However, like Oklahoma and unlike 
Texas,“market price” and “market value” royalties are 
generally paid on contract prices, not on current values 
when the gas is actually extracted.
But unlike both Texas and Oklahoma, royalty is 
generally owed on “take or pay” payments and 
settlements.
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So why all the fuss now?
Because * * *
[Nobody wants to take a lot of profit at their 
producing subsidiary [anymore].
Jim Shaw, Associate Director 
Royalty Management Program 
Minerals Management Service
“U.S. Industry Under Attack for Alleged Royalty 
Underpayments,” O&GJ, Oct. 28,1996 @ 19—20.
Why is that so?
1. The deregulation of natural gas marketing? 
Yes, partly.
2. The “reform” of the % oil & gas depletion 
allowance.
Yes, the principal reason.
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Example 1. using a 27.5% depletion allowance:
By pushing profits upstream or income downstream or 
both, a lessee (not making an arm’s length wellhead sale) 
claims $2.00/Mcf. gross income from the property.
Assuming a 15% royalty/overriding royalty burden, 
lessee’s royalty obligation is 300. Assuming a 5% 
production tax, lessee’s proportionate share of production 
taxes is 10¢. Thus, lessee’s net royalty/tax burden is 38.5¢.
Lessee’s depletion allowance is 46.75¢ [production @ 
$2.00/Mcf less 15% royalty burden times 27.5% depletion 
allowance].
Lessee gains 8.25¢  [the difference between 46.75¢ 
depletion and 38.5¢ royalty/ production-tax burden].
Example 2. using a 27.5% depletion allowance.
Lessee claims gross income of only $1.00/Mcf.
Lessee’s total royalty burden is 15¢, and lessee’s 
proportionate share of production tax is 4.25¢. Thus, 
lessee’s total royalty/tax burden in 19.25¢.
Lessee’s share of the 27.5% percentage depletion 
allowance is 23.375¢.
Lessee gains 4.125¢ [half of the 8.25¢ net benefit 
realized if the gas is valued at $2.00/Mcf.].
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Compare @ 15% Depletion
Example 1.
At $2.00/Mcf, lessee’s share of percentage depletion is 25.5¢. 
Lessee’s royalty/tax burden would still be 38.5¢.
Lessee loses 13¢.
Example 2
At $1.00/Mcf, lessee’s share is 12.75¢. Lessee’s royalty 
burden would still be 19.25¢.
Lessee loses only 6.50.
Compare Cost Depletion
No incentive to re-direct profits or costs. All costs, whether 
upstream or down, are deductible or depreciable.
Royalty History
“[T]here is something in the nature of the property right 
itself—something in the nature of the “bundle of 
sticks” that is a royalty that answers the question: The 
lessor’s percentage is a percentage of what? 
Consistent with the sharing arrangement with the 
Crown that gave the “royalty” interest its name, the 
most obvious answer is that the lessor’s royalty 
entitles the lessor to a share of the produced mineral in 
its natural state, after the mineral has been brought to 
the surface by the lessee.”
Williams at al., “Determining the Royalty Owner’s Share of Post-Production Costs ...
41 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-1,12-5 (1995). See also, Anderson,“David v. Goliath ...
,” 27B Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 1029,1114-16 (1982).
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My Findings
There is no evidence of a “property law” definition of 
royalty or that the established point of royalty 
valuation was at the mouth of the mine or well (the 
point where raw ore or oil or gas was converted from 
real to personal property).
Rather the royalty entitlement depended entirely upon 
the language of the governing ordinance, decree, or 
contract.
Contractual terms varied, but payment of royalty upon 
the value of a merchantable product was common.
Sources other than the U.S.
Ancient Greece, the silver mines of Laurium, circa 480 b.c. 
Roman Empire, marble quarries.
Cornwall & Devon, England, tin, 1263 - 1830s.
Derbyshire, England, lead, 1288.
Spain, precious metals, circa 1387 a.d. and circa 1559. 
New Spain, precious metals, 1700s.
England, metals, 1850s.
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Early U.S. Law
1. The royalty obligation is a sharing arrangement.
2. Payment obligations are determined by reasonably 
construing the royalty clause in light of the parties’ 
reasonable expectations and the clause’s anticipatory nature.
3. Royalty valuation depends upon the language of the 
royalty clause, not upon a property law definition of royalty.
4. Royalty valuation is commonly tied to the marketability.
5. Royalty valuation excludes value added by transportation.
6. If production is first sold beyond the first market, early 
cases are both divided and counter-intuitive on whether 
downstream profits must be shared with the royalty owner.
Early U.S. Law
Wright v. Warrior Run Coal Co. 
Audenreid v. Woodward 
Wolfing v. Ralston 
Maloney v. Love 
Wemple v. Producer’s Oil Co.
Clark v. Slick Oil Co.
Busbey v. Russell 
Scott v. Steinberger 
Martin v. Amos
Barton v. Laclede Oil & Mining Co. 
Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co.
Rains v. Kentucky Oil Co.
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer 
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen
9
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Scholarly Commentary
Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases § 85 (2d ed. 1940).
“If it is the lessee's obligation to market the 
product, it seems necessarily to follow that his is 
the task also to prepare it for market, if it is 
unmerchantable in its natural form. It is erroneous 
to read into the royalty clause stipulations 
concerning the cost of marketing and preparation 
which are not specifically expressed.”
Fundamental Contract Law.
If a party to a contract owes a particular duty of 
performance [such as the duty to market 
production] that party has an obligation to absorb 
the costs of performance in absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary.
This principle is so fundamental that contracts scholars only 
discuss it in the context of whether unforeseen costs may 
excuse performance under the doctrines of impossibility and 
impracticability. There is never a suggestion that the other 
party to the contract is charged with such costs. Farnsworth, 
Contracts § 9.6 (2d ed. 1990); Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 
1963 (3d ed. 1978); Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1333 (1962).
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Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas, § 40.5(b) (1989).
“[T]here is a distinction between acts which 
constitute production and acts which constitute 
processing or refining .... Unquestionably, under 
most leases, the lessee must bear all costs of 
production. There is, however, no reason to impose 
on the lessee the costs of refining or processing the 
product, unless an intention to do so is revealed by 
the lease. It is submitted that the acts which 
constitute production have not ceased until a 
marketable product has been obtained. After a 
marketable product has been obtained, then further 
costs ... should be shared by the lessor and the 
lessee....”
OTHER SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY 
FAVORABLE TO A FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT RULE
Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas § 7.4 (3d. Ed. 1991).
Walker, “The Nature of Property Interests Created by an 
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas,” 10 Tex. L. Rev. 291, 313 (1932).
Thuss, Texas Oil and Gas Law § 126 (2d ed. 1935).
Compare:
Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 645.2 (1995);
Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas § 589 (1958);
Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law §§ 92 and70 (1955).
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Conclusions Respecting Part I
1. The primary cause of current royalty litigation is 
depletion reform. Natural gas deregulation is 
secondary.
2. Throughout early history (both U.S. and foreign), 
royalty provisions have been construed in light of:
their express language; 
the parties’ reasonable expectations; 
their anticipatory nature; 
and their purpose.
3. Early U. S. case law supports a marketability 
approach.
Part 2
Should Courts Contemplate the Forest or Dissect Each Tree? 
(a look a modern royalty case law)
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My basic conclusion:*
Many modern gas royalty clauses* should be viewed 
as a forest of clauses expressing similar anticipatory 
obligations to share with the lessor.
Royalty clauses are intentionally general in language 
so that they will function fairly and efficiently for 
what may be decades of production, regardless of 
the specific circumstances.
Unfortunately, many modern royalty cases ignore the 
fundamental principle that royalty means a “share.”
* Not included are clauses drafted by lessors, state, federal or 
Indian leases, and clauses custom drafted for a specific use.
Construction of Royalty Clauses
“Too much dependence is placed upon the language of 
a printed form, in the preparation of which at least one 
party has had no part and to the selection of which the 
other frequently has given no consideration, if upon a 
variance of that language a difference is established in 
a duty not specifically referred to.” Maurice Merrill, Covenants 
Implied in Oil and Gas Leases § 85 (2d ed. 1940).
“[Royalty rights] must be determined, not by isolating 
certain words from the connection in which they occur, 
and putting an interpretation upon them without regard 
to their relative situation, but by considering all the 
language of which the words form a part.” Maloney v. Love, 
52 P. 1029 (Colo. Ct. App. 1898).
13
 
i
 
 
" " 
 
 
"
i
"
s  
"[
i
"
 
 
“Resort to grammatical parsing is less instructive . . .  
than is a consideration of the purpose of the gas 
royalty clause, taken as a whole.” Piney Woods Country Life
School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).
Regrettably, however, the Piney Woods court failed to 
heed its own advice.
Often, modern royalty cases distinguish words that 
are really synonyms.
Examples:
Vela (distinguishing “market price” and “proceeds”) 
and Piney Woods (distinguishing “market value” and 
“proceeds”).
But see, Tara Petroleum Corp., Hilliard, and Henry (making no 
such distinction).
Roye Realty (in dicta, suggesting a distinction 
between “proceeds” and “amount realized”).
But see, Upham (“Webster defines ... ‘proceeds’ as the 
‘amount realized from the sale of property’....”) and Skaggs 
(the court held that “amount received” means “proceeds”).
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Perhaps inadvertently: Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Coffee.
The court makes an evidentiary distinction between 
“market price” (established by looking at actual arm’s 
length contracts and sales) and “market value” 
(established by expert testimony concerning market 
prices).
The court made no substantive distinction between 
these terms, but merely preferred the former as 
evidence where a single price was known.
Where did this “parsing” get started?
Veld See also, Foster (an earlier federal case reaching a similar 
result).
Gas contract was made in 1934 for the life of the lease 
at 2.30 per Mcf. (Initially, there was no market because 
purchaser was unwilling to pay 30 for compression.)
At time of litigation, new gas was being sold for 16¢  
per Mcf., less 3¢ for compression. Lessors essentially 
sued for the difference pursuant to a “market price” 
royalty clause.
Held: 5 to 4 for the lessors.
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Royalty clauses contemplate market realities.
They refer to “market price,” “market value,” 
“proceeds,” or “amount realized” -- terms well 
known to the marketplace.
These terms require:
a willing buyer, 
a willing seller, 
a marketable product, 
a market, and 
a sale.
And contrary to Vela-type cases, the same gas from 
the same field can have different market values.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum illustrates this.
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The most unfortunate Vela-type case: Piney Woods.
The key words of the bifurcated royalty clauses:
If sold/used off the premises: “market value at the well” 
If sold at the well: “amount realized”
Judge Wisdom held that the gas was not sold at the 
well.
To hold otherwise “would place the lessors at the 
mercy of the lessee” and allow lessee to “avoid the 
payment of market value royalty.”
“[S]trange results ... may occur if the determination of 
whether gas is ‘sold at the well’ turns solely on the 
place where title passes.”
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The Piney Woods Gamblers’ Bargain
“A landowner is offered leases by two producers. 
The first offers a 1/8 market value royalty; the 
second offers a 1/6 proceeds royalty. The 
landowner decides to lease to the first operator, 
because he thinks the market value of gas will rise 
enough to compensate for the lower fractional 
share. This is a business risk: if the price does not 
rise enough, the lessor loses money. If, however, 
the price rises as the lessor thought, the lessor has 
won his bet, just as the lessee has lost his gamble 
that the price would not rise....”
“At some point, the lessee may find the continued 
operation so unprofitable that it is more economical to 
cease production. At this point the lessor has a strong 
incentive to renegotiate the lease.”
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Where are we? The gas was not sold at the well; thus, 
royalty is owed on current “market value at the well.”
Problem: the gas at the well is “extremely sour” and and 
must be converted into “marketable sweet gas.”
At the Well “describes not only the location of the gas 
for royalty purposes, but its quality....”
The End Result: A Real Gamblers’ Bargain
(1) If gas is truly sold “at the well,” royalty is owed on the 
sale proceeds (perhaps set by a long-term, fixed-price 
contract).
(2) If gas is not sold at the well, royalty is due on current 
market value at the well when extracted.
(3) The lessee controls where the gas is sold (limited by 
market realities and good faith), provided that a sale 
ostensibly made at the well must really be at the well, not 
“off the premises.”
(4) Provided however, that “market value at the well” for 
gas sold “off the premises” may be determined by 
subtracting post-wellhead costs (including a rate of 
return after taxes) from the contract price (not current 
market value), if the trial judge concludes that this “least 
desirable” valuation method is nevertheless appropriate 
under the circumstances.
Judge Wisdom’s Solution: 
although “least desirable,” 
“market value” royalty can 
be calculated by taking the 
“actual sales price of gas 
less costs” after all.
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“Wild Cards” for future Piney Woods:
The trial court’s discretion concerning:
(1) Whether lessee’s “at the well” sale violates the implied 
duty to market at the best available price and terms?
(2) Whether an “at-the-well” sale is really at the well?
(3) What constitutes the best evidence of “market value at 
the well” for gas sold “off the premises”? (comparable 
sales, expert testimony of value, or the actual 
downstream contract price less post-wellhead costs)
(4) Whether the the lessee’s actual calculation of post­
wellhead “costs” is appropriate?
The Bottom Line
Neither a lessor nor a lessee would knowingly make this 
gamblers’ bargain.
If lessors were really concerned about being locked into 
the pricing terms of a long-term contract that was not of 
their making, they would insist on a pure “market value” 
royalty clause like the one in Vela.
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But a lessee would not knowingly accept such a 
bargain, let alone draft a lease royalty clause with this 
intent.
In a rising market, lessee would have to pay more and 
more royalty even though the lessee may have made 
a prudent decision to sell gas for a set term at a fixed 
price.
Lessees’ Intent
Regarding post-wellhead costs, lessees knew how to 
address them directly:
“Lessor’s interest shall bear its proportion of any 
compression, treating, and other expenses 
necessary to render the gas marketable.”
Maddox v. Texas Co., construing a lease dated October 29,1945.
But, as George Siefken teaches in his 1954 article.
An alert lessor could too easily amend this clause:
NOT
“Lessor’s interest shall  bear....”
21
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Three Fundamental Principles
1. A royalty clause should be construed in its 
entirety against the party who offered it, in light of 
the fact that it is the means by which the lessor 
receives the primary consideration for a productive 
lease.
2. In light of legal history and absent an express 
lease provision, a lessee who discovers oil or gas 
in paying quantities is obliged to “produce” a 
“marketable product.”
3. When a marketable product is first obtained: is a 
question of fact; is the logical point where the 
exploration and production segment of the oil & 
gas industry ends; is when the primary objective of 
the lease is achieved; and is thus the logical point 
for the calculation of royalty.
The Troublesome California “at the well” Cases:
Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co.
Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State.
Troublesome “at the well” cases from other states:
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank., TX
Schroeder v. Terra Energy Ltd., Ml
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Heritage Resources. Inc. v. NationsBank 
“market value of gas at the well”
The court concludes:
that “market value at the well” has a commonly 
accepted meaning in the oil and gas industry and
that “market value” means “the price a willing seller 
obtains from a willing buyer.”
But, then concludes
that “market value at the well” can be calculated by 
“subtracting reasonable post-production marketing 
costs....”
The lease in NationsBank also provided:
“there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor’s 
royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of 
dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter 
to market such gas.”
The court concludes that this language was “surplusage as 
a matter of law.”
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What did the lessors intend?
Their intent was to share in all proceeds received by 
the lessee for the sale of oil and gas without 
deductions
-even beyond the point of first-marketability,
-but never less than market value at the well as a 
hedge against “sweetheart” sales.
Query whether a court should honor this intent, given 
the lessors’ retention of the phrase “at the well”?
The Troublesome “marketable product” cases: 
Wood v. TXO, OK 
TXO v. CLO, OK
Sternberger, KN (not so troublesome) 
Garman, CO
various compression cases
24
 
 
-eve  
-but
i " "  
' " "  
~ " " :
 
 
,  
 
 
The Troublesome “proceeds” cases.
Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co., “net returns,” WY 
Upham v. Ladd, “proceeds,” TX 
West v. Alpar, “proceeds,” ND
Schroeder v. Terra Energy Ltd., “gross proceeds,” Ml
Martin v. Glass, “net proceeds,” TX
Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., “net proceeds,” KS
The Economist Ponders the Forest
Ex Post: Royalty is inefficient, like an excise tax.
Ex Ante: Royalty is rational and reasonably efficient.
Royalty may be “cost free,” but it is not “risk free.”
Problems with royalty clauses result from bad 
drafting or unfortunate court decisions or both.
Basic marketplace realties (such as “marketability”) 
should be considered in properly interpreting royalty 
clauses.
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Conclusions
Construe lease royalty clauses as a whole in light of the 
following factors:
>royalty clauses are anticipatory in nature;
>they call for a sharing;
>they govern royalty for the duration of production;
>because leases are freely assignable and often 
assigned, lessees have a variety of lease forms in their 
portfolios, the terms of which cannot be efficiently nor 
easily honored if every variation among the royalty 
clauses is subjected to grammatical parsing .
Unfortunately, many courts tend to over-interpret 
royalty clauses, often emphasizing a single word or 
phrase, e.g.:
“produced and sold or used,”
“off the premises,”
“at the well,”
“amount realized,”
“proceeds,” or 
“market value.”
“free of cost in the pipeline”
This approach is illustrated by cases such as 
Vela,
Middleton,
Piney Woods,
NationsBank.
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The Typical Royalty Clause Contemplates:
-real and willing buyers 
-real and willing sellers
-dealing with a real product in the real marketplace
-actual commercial sales of a “product”
(requiring both “production” & “marketing”)
The Typical Royalty Clause Does Not Contemplate:
-that royalty be paid on value added by post- 
production”
(that is after a first-marketable product is in fact 
obtained)
The Effect of A Marketable-Product Approach
-simplifies royalty accounting by using known values
-separates the e & p segment of the industry at the 
logical place
-treats lessees the same regardless of size or situation 
[lessees do not share downstream profits or losses with 
lessors]
-through royalty accounting, lessors share 
transportation costs whether incurred before or after 
marketability is obtained [including compression not 
directly related to extraction]
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Litigation
-overall, less likely (as valuation is simplified)
-class actions on a field-wide basis may be more likely
-class actions on a region- or state-wide basis less likely.
My Views Are Adopted In
Rogers et al. v. Westerman Farm Company et al., 
97CA0293, 1998 WL 89587 (Col. Ct. App. Dec. 24,1998).
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